No-Fly Zones and Other Military Options

The debate over na No-Fly Zone over Libya is intensifying, and some are calling for more direct military intervention. So much of the rhetoric appears to be occurring in a vacuum that it may be worth returning to a few first principles and home truths. (For the moment, I'm going to leave aside the blowback from playing into Qadhafi's hands by making it look like the rebels are Western puppets: I'm just going to look at the practicalities.)

You cannot commit forces you do not have. I have heard few if any of the advocates of increased US involvement call for 1) a military draft or 2) massive tax hikes to support a huge increase in our military forces, already committed to two wars. I, too, would like for Clark Kent to slip out of the Daily Planet, change into Superman, fly to Libya, and, oh, let's say throw Qadhafi into the sun with a single heave. But I can't find the area code for Metropolis, or even for Gotham City to ask Commissioner Gordon to crank up the Bat-Signal. Absent those solutions, we're stuck with an overcommitted US Armed Forces, many of whose front-line troops are on their fourth or fifth deployment, or worse, with dwindling budgets and massive stress, and they're a volunteer force, so the longer this goes on, the harder replenishment will be. And we don't even have one carrier in the Med. Not one, save a recently deployed helicopter carrier. Take on MiGs and Sukhois with helicopters? You go first, please. Where will we run our No-Fly Zone from? Europe?

Libya is big. Sure it doesn't have many people, and most live near the coast, but the air bases are scattered inland, and by many accounts the African mercenary troops are being flown into desert air bases like Sabha, and a no-fly zone would presumably want to stop that. So you really want to deny the whole airspace. Libya is 679,359 square miles in area; or 1,759,541 square kilometers. The whole of Iraq (and even when the northern and southern no-fly zones were both in place, the whole country was never included) is 169,234 square miles, or 438,317 square kilometers. (Numbers are from Wikipedia.) Or, for the mathematically challenged, Libya is four times the area of Iraq, and some of its key airfields are deep in the Sahara. And we never enforced a no-fly zone over all of Iraq.

You need either carriers or bases nearby. We may be able to dispatch B-2s from Missouri or B-52s from Diego Garcia to make the rubble bounce in troubled regions, but a no-fly zone requires continuing combat air patrol to deny the skies to the bad guys, and that requires fairly close-in bases, large deployments, and high sortie rates. For the Iraqi northern no-fly zone we had NATO bases in eastern Turkey, and for the southern we had carriers in the Gulf and bases in Kuwait, Qatar and, with a wink and a nod, probably Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Now let's look at the options in Libya.

1. Carriers.We would have to bring the USS Enterprise from its current Gulf deployment, and it's due for retirement soon anyway, and is supposed to be supporting those other two wars. Of other NATO allies in the Mediterranean, France has one active carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, homeported in Toulon, and some older ones in mothballs. Italy has two, Garibaldi and Cavour, both short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) carriers, homeported in Taranto and La Spezia, respectively. Spain also has two STOVL carriers, Principe de Asturias and the new Juan Carlos I, only just commissioned in September, both homeported in Rota. These STOVL carriers, sometimes called "Harrier carriers," embark AV-8B Harrier aircraft, which have limitations in speed and range against frontline fighters, and helicopters. Britain has one STOVL carrier still in service, HMS Illustrious, homeported in Portsmouth and not, so far as I know, in the Med. That's it for NATO, unless they can get Russia or India to join the party.
2. Land Bases. One could wish that Egypt would be willing to commit its western air bases or even its Air Force itself nto operations over Libya, but in the present revolutionary situations there and in Tunisia (which has a minuscule armed forces), this seems unlikely, and even offering to host Western forces would be difficult if not impossible. Right now the Egyptian Armed Forces are not only running the country but trying to provide police functions as well, with the State Security Forces somewhere between dissolved and in opposition. Similarly, though the rebel forces are apparently in control of the old British airbase at Tobruk and other Libyan airbases in the east, they seem unlikely to host foreign air operations there. Other nearby land bases could include a) Malta, with a number of bases that served well for the RAF in World War II, but aren't terribly current; b) the British Sovereign Bases at Akrotiri and Dhekelia on Cyprus; c) various NATO and Italian airfields in Italy, Sicily, and offshore islands. The closest to Libya would be an airstrip on Lampedusa, apparently just a civil airfield, but I don't think it could sustain combat aircraft operations. A bit farther away is Pantelleria, from which bombers operated during World War II, but neither is exactly ready, so far as I know at least, for modern air war. For all I know there may be covert bases in some of these places, but if so, they're still covert from me.
3. A Regi0nal Operation.There are reports that the Arab League has suspended Libya's membership, OPEC is moving to increase production, etc. If this all proves to be both true and somehow substantive. the possibility of some sort of regional collective action, unprecedented as it might be, could increase, and that could allow a figleaf for, say, the Egyptian Air Force to step in. Experience suggests pigs will fly before this happens, but I must note that experience has not been the most reliable guide lately.
   

Having noted these obstacles to a No-Fly Zone, need I discuss the problems of a ground force intervention?

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Egypt's Military Council: The Names

Two and a half weeks after Egypt's Supreme Military Council stepped in to push Mubarak out, they have finally published a list of their 20 members. The list in Arabic is here, Besides Defense Minister Tantawi and the heads of each of the services, it includes the commanders of the military districts, the field armies, the border guards, and four Deputy Ministers of Defense. I'll try to put up a fuller analysis this evening.

I know they're keeping a low profile, but why did it take this long to get a list of the members of the body running the country?

Zeinobia has some profiles in English.

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Mixed Signals in Cairo?

With so much attention focused on Libya, it's worth a moment to note the curious events of last night and today in Cairo. Last night the military police — that is, uniformed representatives of the ruling military, not the hated security police — broke up the strikers in Tahrir Square and also dispersed demonstrators around the Parliament and Cabinet building, who have been seeking the ouster of Prime Minister Ahmad Rashid. Protesters were also set upon by masked men as well as uniformed military police. Some were tasered, others hit with sticks or short whips. (No shots, thankfully.) People were vowing to come out in strength today, fearing the military had decided to shut the demonstrators down despite backing them in the past. And then, today, the Army apologized. It said the attacks were unauthorized, and no order had been given or will be given to attack the protesters, and that all those detained would be released.

Al-Ahram Online in English here. Blogger Zeinobia with firsthand accounts, photos, and video here. The Higher Military Council continues to post its communiques on its Facebook page, (but only its communiques: don't look for a list of members, still somewhat mysterious); the key apology communique is here (in Arabic).

At this point I don't know how to read this. A division within the Military Council? A rogue military police commander? A misunderstood order? Something more sinister? It's worth watching as the apology seems very unusual, and its contrite tone puzzling if reassuring.

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Egypt's Military Sector of the Economy: A Dissenting View

I must confess that I myself, in this blog and in interviews, have contributed to the widespread view that Egypt's military controls its own huge chunk of the manufacturing sector of the economy, with estimates that this could amount to a third of the entire economy. I also must confess that much of my experience in the matter dates from the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Jonathan Wright offers a strong dissent to this received wisdom. I can't say for certain that he's right, but I can say that his information is much more current than mine, or many of the other Egypt hands who've been pontificating. I'll defer to him unless other information is forthcoming.

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Some Quick Takes from the Day After the Party

The Party's over, and today the partiers cleaned up Tahrir Square and scrubbed the lions on Qasr al-Nil bridge. That's a sign of the new, self-reliant young Egyptian in itself. More importantly, since what happens next is in the hands of the Higher Military Council, we got a few clues about their thinking. The statement that Egypt will honor all international obligations and treaties got most of the coverage in the United States and Israel, but they also promised to move towards genuinely free and democratic elections. That's the good news.

What they did not do is lift the State of Emergency. The generals are naturally security conscious, but until the State of Emergency is lifted, I think there will be a grain of suspicion in the mind of the demonstrators. And while they promised free and democratic elections, they gave no timetable. But whatever the generals may think, I really don't think this could be 1952 all over again, when the Army promises much but keeps power for itself. 1952 was a classic, seize-the-radio-station putsch, while this was a case of the Army refusing to stop a popular revolution. (I suspect the generals doubted a conscript Army would fire on their own.) Secondly, in 1952, you could seize the radio station. Even the complete shutdown of the Internet in Egypt did not stop people from getting posts to Twitter and Facebook, even through methods like using old dialup connections in Europe. It isn't 1952 any more. The Army may end up playing a Turkish-style role as guarantor of the system, but I really think they can't hijack the victory won in the streets. Perhaps I'm overly romantic.

But that raises another question. I keep seeing media backgrounders indicating that the Higher Military Council is headed by Field Marshal Tantawi, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Enan, etc., but the last picture I saw of them was at the meeting on Thursday that issued "Communique Number 1." Obviously something changed after Mubarak's speech Thursday night and the Army pushed harder on Friday. So far as I can tell, all the statements are being read by a man in the eagle and crossed swords of a Major General. That may seem high ranking for a spokesman, but Egypt has a lot of Major Generals. I once had one serve as my driver, in uniform, and he changed his own flat tire. (Do US Major Generals change their own flats?)

But this Major General (I don't know if he's been identified by name) is the visible face of the Military Council. Here is Communique Number 4:



I haven't seen any TV shots of Tantawi or Enan since Thursday.Why, if they're running the country? Maybe I'm being a little paranoid, but it's a question I haven't seen much commented upon. Perhaps tomorrow.

Note that I won't be posting a lot over the weekend, but will comment as needed.

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Bayan Raqm Wahid

Though military coups are rare lately, they were once common enough in the Arab world that the phrase "Bayan Raqm Wahid" — communique number one — is actually a cliche in Arabic to mean a military coup. So it's not surprising that when the protesters heard that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces had issued "Bayan Raqm Wahid" today, and it appeared to indicate that the Armed Forces were stepping in, it's easily understood why the crowds thought the end was near. The Supreme Military Council rarely meets, and hasn't met publicly since 1973, and quite visibly neither Mubarak nor Suleiman was at the meeting as shown on Egyptian TV. Then Lt.Gen. Sami Enan, the Chief of Staff [clarification: I'm told it was the Cairo regional commander], went to Tahrir, told the protesters the Army supported their legitimate demands, and told a --porter that "it's over," the impression grew.

CIA Director Leon Panetta seemed to think so, too, when he told Congress it was likely Mubarak would go tonight. President Obama seemed to expect more, too. Given tyhe close communications between the US and the Egyptian military, one wonders if the Armed Forces themselves thought Mubarak would do more. That's why everyone is wondering if there will be a communique number two. It certainly does look like the Army thought it had persuaded someone of something, and then Mubarak offered half measures.

For those with Arabic, here's the announcement and scenes of the military council meeting.

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Where Will They Put the February 10 Bridge?

Cairo already has a July 26 Bridge and an October 6 bridge. Where will they put the February 10 bridge, if this turns out to be what it increasingly looks like?

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More on the Supreme Council

I'm seeing reports that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has only publicly announced meeting three times: 1967, 1973, and today.

Note that the official statement said that "the military" convened the Supreme Council, not that the Commander-in-Chief (Mubarak) did.

I think the Army is in the driver's seat.

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Is rhe Army Moving?

The Egyptian military's "Supreme Council" has supposedly been meeting. It's not clear to me if this simply means the high command or if we're seeing an emerging soft coup. Anyway, talk that Mubarak is about to step aside is now universal. This could be a busy day. Stay tuned.

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Al-‘Ubur al-Thani

Egyptian Armed Forces Day is currently celebrated on October 6, the anniversary of the Army's proudest moment, al-‘Ubur (the Crossing): the crossing of the Suez Canal and attack on the Bar-Lev line in 1973.

If the Army announcement of today holds firm, January 31 may deserve to be celebrated as al-‘ubur al-thani, the second great Crossing. Crowds were chanting, "the Army and the People are one."

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Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain: Gen Rachid Ammar

By most accounts, a key figure in the transitional government in Tunis has not appeared in public, made any statements, or held any press conferences. This would be General Rachid Ammar, head of the Tunisian Army. It is hard to find a picture of the man: the ones at left are the best I could find. He's about 63 or 64, born at Sayada in the Tunisian Sahel, the central coastal plain which was the origin of both Habib Bourguiba (Monastir) and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali (Hammam Sousse). Since his predecessor and much of the General Staff died in a helicopter accident in 2002, he has been Chief of Staff of the Tunisian Army.

The Army is traditionally apolitical, The land forces number only about 27,000, and though Ben Ali himself came originally from the Army, it has long been marginalized in favor of the security services, which may have numbered as many as 120,000, or even far more.

The exact sequence of events late last week remains obscure, but various media have reported that when General Ammar refused to fire on the demonstrators, he was sacked by Ben Ali. A day or so after that, Ben Ali was himself out of a job, and the role of the Army remains obscure but widely speculated upon. Almost certainly the Army issued some sort of ultimatum. There have been allegations elsewhere in the Arab world that the United States urged Ammar to move against Ben Ali, but there is no particular reason to credit that over any of the other rumors that have circulated. In any event, by most accounts, General Ammar is back in control of the Army, and the Army is said to have stepped in to separate the police from demonstrators, and to arrest some police chiefs. Reports of fraternization between troops and demonstrators have appeared, and some pictures and videos.

General Ammar, like most Tunisian military men, has remained unheralded and obscure. His French Wikipedia entry is fuller than his English one, and this article, also in French, also offers some information.

Is he the power behind the interim government, or simply its protector? Nobody knows; he remains the man behind the curtain.

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Wikileaks Publishes Assessment of Egyptian Military

The latest round of Wikileaks on Egypt isn't just about the Mubarak succession. There's also a discussion of an even more taboo subject (in Egypt at least): the Egyptian military. A 2008 cable from Ambassador Scobey sums up discussions with academics about the state of Egypt's military. The academics included unnamed figures from the Al-Ahram Center, Cairo University and AUC. I hope for their sake their anonymity is not too compromised, especially for those in the government-funded institutions. That's the problem here: lots of Egyptians will tell you exactly what they told the Embassy, but the release of the cable could jeopardize their jobs. I only link to it because it's already out there: online at the above link, written about by Le Monde yesterday (article is in French), and there's even a #wikileaksEgypt hashtag on Twitter. Since the document's out, my own commentary shouldn't compound the harm. (See the previous post and this one for more on my attitude toward Wikleaks.)

Here are some key passages:

A series of recent conversations with academics and other civilian analysts reveals their sense that while Egypt's military is in decline, it nevertheless remains a powerful institution.

. . . An American University in Cairo (AUC) political science professor with family ties to the officer corps told us that the military reached its peak of influence in the late 1980's before the ouster of the recently deceased former Defense Minister Abu Ghazalah, who was dismissed because of his growing political popularity. He asserted that since 1989, the MOD's influence in Egyptian society has been gradually waning, and the privileged social position of its elite members has been in decline as society's respect for the military fades. One political-military analyst at the GOE-funded Al-Ahram Center who is a retired general noted that military salaries have fallen far below what is available in the private sector, and that a military career is no longer an attractive option for ambitious young people who aspire to join the new business elite instead.

A senior Cairo University political science professor opined that before the 1967 war, military officers were "spoiled," and constituted a social elite. Following the military's poor performance in the 1967 war, he said, officers began a descent out of the upper ranks of society that accelerated after Abu Ghazalah's ouster in 1989. Since Abu Ghazalah, a senior AUC political science professor noted, the regime has not allowed any charismatic figures to reach the senior ranks. "(Defense Minister) Tantawi looks like a bureaucrat," he joked. The AUC professor described the mid-level officer corps as generally disgruntled, and said that one can hear mid-level officers at MOD clubs around Cairo openly expressing disdain for Tantawi. These officers refer to Tantawi as "Mubarak's poodle," he said, and complain that "this incompetent Defense Minister" who reached his position only because of unwavering loyalty to Mubarak is "running the military into the ground." He opined that a culture of blind obedience pervades the MOD where the sole criteria for promotion is loyalty, and that the MOD leadership does not hesitate to fire officers it perceives as being "too competent" and who therefore potentially pose a threat to the regime.

There is a lot more, on the military's continuing economic role, resistance to economic reforms, etc., but nothing students of Egypt won't have encountered before if they've studied the issue. It's worth a read though, now that it's public.

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